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DLD-218 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
No. 10-2291
                              
TODE BGS NGR BAMBANG WISAGENI,
                             Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                Respondent
                                    
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A096-259-805)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Donald V. Ferlise
                                     
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 10, 2010
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 28, 2010)
                            
OPINION
                            
PER CURIAM.
Tode Wisageni, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of an order
denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings.  Respondent has filed a motion for
“summary affirmance,” which we will construe as a motion to summarily deny the
2petition for review.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.7 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Because we agree with
respondent that Wisageni’s petition presents “no substantial question,” id., we will grant
its motion and deny the petition for review.
I.
Wisageni entered the United States in 2000 on a tourist visa and overstayed.  In
2003, he conceded removability before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and applied for
asylum.  A Hindu of Chinese and Balinese ethnicity, Wisageni claimed to have suffered
past persecution in Indonesia on account of his religion and ethnicity.  After a hearing in
December 2004, the IJ denied the asylum application as untimely filed, and denied
withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.  On April 19,
2006, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed.  It agreed that the asylum
application was untimely, and it held that Wisageni failed to show a clear probability that
his life or freedom would be threatened, or that he more likely than not would be tortured.
On September 14, 2009, Wisageni filed a motion to reopen based on “changed
country conditions.”  He submitted newspaper articles, a 2008 Religious Freedom Report
issued by the State Department, and other materials to argue that bombings in 2009 at two
hotels in Jakarta “are evidence of changed country conditions related to a new surge in
radical Islam in Indonesia,” and that “[t]he increase in religious fundamentalism is a fear
that [Wisageni] has of returning to Indonesia.”  Motion to Reopen at ¶ 3.  Wisageni
attached a new I-589 application, claiming that he fears returning to Indonesia “because
now the Indonesian Moslems are more Extreme than before.”  A.R. at 86.
3The BIA denied the motion to reopen.  It noted that Wisageni’s motion was based
on the 2009 hotel bombings, and that he submitted evidence relating to the incidents, to
Islamic extremism, and to problems encountered by minority populations in Indonesia. 
The BIA concluded that the proffered evidence “does not meaningfully reflect ‘changed
country’ conditions in Indonesia sufficient to warrant the reopening of proceedings.” 
A.R. at 3.  In addition, the BIA rejected Wisageni’s request that it consider Mufied v.
Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), noting that Mufied was decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, while this proceeding arises within the jurisdiction of the Third
Circuit.  Wisageni timely petitions for review of the order denying his motion to reopen.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Our review is for abuse of
discretion, “mindful of the ‘broad’ deference that the Supreme Court would have us
afford.”  Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule,
motions to reopen are granted only under compelling circumstances.”).  An abuse of
discretion arises only if the agency decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  This Court defers to BIA factual
determinations “if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole.”  Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir.
2008) (quotation marks omitted).
A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which
4the final administrative decision was rendered.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Wisageni’s
motion plainly was beyond this time limit.  Nevertheless, he sought to invoke an
exception by reapplying for asylum based on “changed circumstances” in Indonesia.  A
motion to reopen filed under this exception must rely on evidence that “is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d
Cir. 2008).  As mentioned, the BIA held that Wisageni failed to show changed country
conditions in Indonesia, and thus concluded that he failed to offer a sufficient basis to
warrant reopening the proceedings.  We discern no abuse of discretion.
Wisageni relied principally upon newspaper accounts of bombings in 2009 at two
hotels in Jakarta.  However, as those newspaper articles make clear, “Indonesia has
experienced four major terrorist attacks this decade [i.e., in the 2000s],” three of which
occurred prior to Wisageni’s 2004 hearing before the IJ.  Indeed, the article submitted
from The Washington Post reflects that the same Marriot Hotel that was bombed in 2009
was the subject of a previous bombing, allegedly by the same terrorist group, in 2003. 
While Wisageni maintains that the 2009 bombings are evidence of “a new surge in radical
Islam,” his own evidence establishes that he could have raised a claim based on a fear
“radical Islam” at the time of his 2004 hearing.  We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s finding that evidence regarding the 2009 hotel bombings does not
reflect a “change” in country conditions in Indonesia.
Wisageni also relies upon the State Department’s 2008 Religious Freedom Report
5as evidence of changed country conditions “with respect to the threat that radical
Islamists pose to religious minorities.”  Opposition to Mtn. For Summary Affirmance at
4.  This Report, however, does not show that conditions of religious persecution have
changed since the 2004 hearing in such a manner as to compel reopening the removal
proceeding.  In addition, with respect to the scholarly journal article that Wisageni
submitted, he concedes that “[t]he events that are described in the article predate
Petitioner’s [2004] hearing,” Opposition to Mtn. For Summary Affirmance at 5, and thus
that article, too, fails to reflect changed conditions.
Wisageni complains that the BIA failed to explain sufficiently its reasons for
concluding that his evidence was insufficient to show changed conditions in Indonesia. 
See Opposition to Mtn. For Summary Affirmance at 6-9.  While we agree that the BIA’s
analysis of the evidence could have been more detailed, we are satisfied that “the decision
is nonetheless sufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful review.”  Wong, 539 F.3d at
231.  The BIA accurately summarized Wisageni’s evidence, and there is no indication
that it overlooked or improperly discounted any of the evidence submitted in reaching its
conclusion that a reopening of the proceedings was unwarranted.
Wisageni also sought to reopen so that the BIA could consider the Second
Circuit’s decision in Mufied, which Wisageni cited as support for the proposition that
“there exists a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in Indonesia.”  Motion
1 We note that, contrary to Wisageni’s suggestion, the Mufied court did not find a
pattern or practice of religious persecution in Indonesia; rather, it remanded the pattern or
practice claim for the BIA to consider that issue in the first instance.  See 508 F.3d at 89.
6
to Reopen at ¶ 14.1  The BIA did not err in refusing to consider Mufied, and it properly
cited instead to controlling precedent from this Court.  See Wong, 539 F.3d at 235
(finding no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese Christians in
Indonesia).  Moreover, the record is clear that Wisageni identifies himself as a Hindu, not
a Christian.  We cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to address
Wisageni’s vague assertion that the Mufied decision was somehow relevant to the claim
raised in his motion to reopen.
Finally, inasmuch as the BIA can be said to have declined to exercise its discretion
sua sponte to reopen the proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review that determination. 
See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion for “summary affirmance” is
granted, and, accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  Wisageni’s motion for a
stay of removal pending appeal is denied as moot.
